On the role of borrowing constraints in public and private universities' choices by Laura Romero
On the role of borrowing constraints in public and private
universities' choices 
Laura Romero
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and Universidad de Malaga
Abstract
We investigate the reasons why universities use different combinations of fees and exams to
guide admission decisions, focusing on the role of borrowing constraints on such decisions.
On the one hand, we show that public universities choose exams and zero fees under
borrowing constraints because exams are efficient allocation devices, and the objective of
public institutions is the maximization of surplus. On the other hand, private universities
prefer the use of fees to guide admission policies since tuition fees are not only an allocation
device but also a source of revenues. Interestingly, we find that while borrowing constraints
do not affect quality and admission standards in the public university, they reduce both
quality and fees in the private.
I am grateful to the Associate Editor, Eric Hanushek, for an insightful remark. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for
valuable and detailed comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. Financial support from the Spanish Ministry
of Education and Science grant SEJ2004−01959 and Marie Curie Research Training Network EEEPE is gratefully
acknowledged. All remaining errors are my own.
Citation: Romero, Laura, (2005) "On the role of borrowing constraints in public and private universities' choices." Economics
Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 6 pp. 1−8
Submitted: March 11, 2005.  Accepted: August 4, 2005.
URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2005/volume9/EB−05I20002A.pdf1 Introduction
The provision of higher education has some distinctive features that diﬀerentiate this market
from others. While the majority of goods and services in an economy are allocated exclusively
by means of prices, the allocation of students to schools is frequently guided as well by exams.
The importance of exams varies depending on the country and institution. For instance, in
many European countries public universities set very low fees and admissions are guided by
exams while private universities are often of lower quality and use mainly fees to allocate
students. In the US, however, many universities are private and non-proﬁt organizations,
and they use both fees and exams to guide admissions.
In this paper we try to explain the observed diﬀerent combinations of fees and exams
used by higher education institutions to guide admission decisions. For this purpose, we
provide universities with an active role in the selection of students. Our analysis is based
on public, surplus-maximizing, and private, proﬁt-maximizing, universities. In our model,
higher education institutions choose their quality and admission policies (a combination of
fees and exams) to pursue their objectives, and we focus on the role of borrowing constraints
in shaping universities’ optimal choices under monopoly.
Our results ﬁt reasonably well the features of the higher education market in many
European countries. The public university prefers exams to fees under borrowing constraints
because the use of exams allows this institution to maximize total surplus. Instead, the
private university uses tuition fees, independently of borrowing constraints, because fees are
not only an allocation device but also a source of revenues. Interestingly, both monopolies
provide the same level of educational quality under perfect capital markets. However, the
tuition fee, and hence, selectivity, is higher at the private institution. We ﬁnd that the
presence of borrowing constraints reduces both private fee and quality, but it does not aﬀect
either quality or admission standards in the public institution.
The empirical evidence on borrowing constraints in higher education is assessed in Carneiro
and Heckman (2002), who argue that long run credit constraints are more important than
short run constraints in explaining the correlation between parental income and college at-
tendance. Although their quantitative importance may be diﬀerent, our analysis is based on
the assumption that both types of credit constraints exist. Under such assumption, Fernán-
dez (1998) and Fernández and Galí (1999) investigate the impact of borrowing constraints
on the relative eﬃciency of fees and exams as allocation devices. However, the existence of
b o r r o w i n gc o n s t r a i n t si si m p o r t a n tn o to n l yf o re ﬃciency but also for equity reasons, since
it prevents poor and talented students from attending college. In this context, Hanushek,
et al. (2004) show that diﬀerent forms of subsidization of college education tend to improve
the eﬃciency of the economy at the expense of higher income inequality. Also related to our
paper is Epple and Romano (2002), in which competition among quality-maximizing univer-
sities is analyzed. Although their model explains observed admission and price policies of
private institutions, they do not investigate how diﬀerent universities’ objectives may aﬀect
these policies.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a model of the higher education
market. Section 3 ﬁrstly analyzes monopolies’ choices under perfect capital markets, and
secondly, under borrowing constraints, and compares both allocations. Section 4 concludes.
Proofs and lengthy computations appear in the Appendix.
12 The Model
2.1 Individuals
The economy consists of a continuum of individuals of measure one. Each individual i is
characterized by a diﬀerent and unobservable ability, ai, and an initial income endowment,
wi, uniformly and independently distributed over the interval [0,1]. An individual i derives
utility from his total lifetime income:
u
i
j = wi − fj + hi, (1)
where fj is university j’s fee, and hi is the accumulated human capital or total earnings of
individual i.
Human capital is increasing in individual’s ability, ai, and in university’s educational
quality, Qj, and both inputs are complements in the determination of earnings. For simplicity
of computations, we assume that human capital has the following functional form:
hi = aiQj. (2)
We consider that the human capital an individual obtains if he does not attend university
is normalized to zero, and then, his utility is equal to his initial endowment, i.e., Ui
0 = wi.
2.2 Universities
There exist two types of universities that produce educational services of quality Qj, where
j = {b, v} stand respectively for public and private. Educational quality may be interpreted
as the prestige of the higher education institution.1
Public and private universities diﬀer in their objectives; while the public university max-
imizes public surplus, the private institution maximizes proﬁts.2 Universities have the same




One explanation for the convexity of costs is the following: if school quality depends
positively on teacher quality, and we abstract from the existence of externalities in research
among faculty members, increasingly higher wages are required to attract better teachers,
provided that the supply of teacher quality is not perfectly elastic.
2.3 Allocation Mechanisms
2.3.1 Exams
Universities may use an entry exam to select the best students among those who are willing
to attend the university. The exam consists of a minimum score and students who obtain a
1Empirical measures of school quality include pupil/teacher ratios, relative wages of teachers, education
expenditures and students’ performance in standardized tests.
2Public surplus is the diﬀerence between the sum of the earnings of students attending the public university
and the costs incurred to provide education.
3This speciﬁcation simpliﬁes calculations and ensures the concavity of the universities’ optimization prob-
lem.
2score equal or higher are accepted into the university. We assume that the exam technology
is able to perfectly reveal student’s ability, which means that students who obtain a score
higher or equal than the minimum required by the university are those of ability ai ≥ aE
j ,
j = {b, v}.
2.3.2 Fees
Students may be allocated to schools also by means of tuition fees. This mechanism selects
students according to their willingness and ability to pay university’s fee. Individuals decide
whether to attend university or remain uneducated by means of comparing their utility
with and without education. Let ˆ aj be the ability of the student who is indiﬀerent between





Students of ability ai ≥ ˆ aj are willing to attend university j while students of ability
ai < ˆ aj prefer to remain uneducated.
3 Universities’ Optimal Choices under Monopoly
In this section we analyze universities’ optimal choices of quality, fees and exams, in the
case in which there is only one institution, either public or private, in the higher education
market. Our benchmark is an economy with perfect capital markets, in which students can
borrow any amount to ﬁnance their education investments. For simplicity, the interest rate
is constant and equal to zero. Next, we introduce borrowing constraints in the economy
and compare the results with those obtained for the benchmark economy. The timing of
decisions is the following: in the ﬁrst stage, each monopoly chooses educational quality, Qj.
In the second stage, the tuition fee, fj, is decided. In the third stage, each institution decides
whether to run an exam or accept all applications. We solve the universities’ problem by
backward induction.4
3.1 Perfect Capital Markets
3.1.1 Public University








(aiQb − C (Qb)) da dw, (5)
where the superscript p stands for perfect capital markets.
Exams. In the third stage, the public university decides whether to run an exam or accept
4Convavity and the solution to the universities’ optimization problem are shown in the second part of the
Appendix.
3all applications, given fb and Qb. The optimal public exam determines a critical level of
ability, a
p
b,t h a ts a t i s ﬁes
a
p





b ≥ b ab. (6)






Qb if fb ≤ C (Qb),
fb
Qb if fb >C(Qb).
(7)
Hence, the public university runs an exam if fb ≤ C (Qb), and accepts all applicants
otherwise.
Fees. In the second stage, the public monopoly chooses f
p
b to maximize (5), where ab = a
p
b,
given by (7). We obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 Under perfect capital markets, the public university chooses exams and charges
anything below or equal to the cost, including a zero tuition fee.
In the presence of perfect capital markets, tuition fees do not limit admissions and then,
exams and fees are both eﬃcient allocation devices because they select students according
to their ability (see Fernández (1998) and Fernández and Galí (1999)). Since the optimal
allocation of students is independent of the instrument chosen, the public university would
choose a fee equal to the cost in case of accepting all applications. In such case, and according
to (7), the public university runs an exam and charges any fee below or equal the cost.





Qb . The optimal level of public quality, Q
p



















b < 1. The optimal level of public educational quality depends positively on the




2 . This result illustrates
the fact that students are not only consumers of higher education, but also inputs in its
production, as described by Rothschild and White (1995).
3.1.2 Private University








(fv − C(Qv)) da dw. (9)
Exams. In the third stage, the private institution chooses the critical level of ability, ap
v,
that maximizes (9) subject to ap
v ≥
fv




Qv if fv ≥ C(Qv), and shut down if fv <C (Qv).
Fees. In the second stage, whenever fv ≥ C(Qv), the private monopoly chooses the fee, fp
v,
that maximizes (9), where av =
fv




Qv + C (Qv)
2
, (10)
if 0 ≤ Qv ≤ 1. Otherwise, the private university decides to shut down.5
Quality. In the ﬁrst stage, the private monopoly decides the level of educational quality that





















The following proposition compares admission policies and quality in both monopolies:
Proposition 2 In the presence of perfect capital markets, public and private universities
provide the same quality under monopoly, although the private institution is more selective
than the public.
Selectivity is measured by the ability of the least able student accepted into the university.
While the public university charges any fee below or equal the cost under perfect capital
markets, the private university chooses a fee above the cost in order to make positive proﬁts.
Since educational quality is equal in both universities, the higher fee chosen by the private
monopoly attracts students of higher ability than those attending the public.
3.2 Borrowing Constraints
We next turn to analyze universities’ choices in the presence of borrowing constraints. We
assume that students cannot borrow at all to ﬁnance their investments in education, and
then, only individuals with income wi ≥ fj are able to attend university j.
3.2.1 Public University








(aiQb − C(Qb)) da dw, (12)
where the superscript c stands for borrowing constraints.
Exams. In the third stage, the university decides whether to run an exam or accept all
applicants, taking as given fb and Qb. The level of ability, ac
b, that maximizes (12) subject
to ab ≥
fb
Qb, is the same as in the case of perfect capital markets, and is given by (7).
Fees. In the second stage, the university chooses the tuition fee anticipating the optimal
choice of exams in the following stage, and taking educational quality as given. The solution
to this problem is the following:
5Notice that Qv ≤ 1 is required for fp
v ≥ C(Qv) to hold since C (Qv) ≤ Qv if and only if Qv ≤ 1.
5Proposition 3 In the presence of borrowing constraints, admission decisions in the public
university are guided by exams and the optimal tuition fee is equal to zero.
The existence of complementarities between ability and quality implies that total income
is maximized when students are allocated to schools according to their ability. The proof
shows that whenever 0 ≤ Qb ≤ 1 the public institution chooses an admission policy based
on exams and a zero tuition fee, and shuts down the school otherwise. The policy chosen
allows the public university to maximize total surplus provided that any positive fee would
prevent some poor and talented individuals from attending the university in the presence of
borrowing constraints.
Quality. In the ﬁrst stage, the public university decides the quality level, Qc
b, that maximizes
(12), subject to ab =
C(Qb)
Qb and fb =0 , whenever 0 ≤ Qb ≤ 1. The maximization problem
at this stage is exactly the same as in the presence of perfect capital markets, and then, the
optimal level of public quality also satisﬁes (8). Hence, quality and admission standards are
not aﬀected by borrowing constraints.
3.2.2 Private University








(fv − C(Qv)) da dw. (13)
Exams. The private institution chooses the ability threshold, ac
v, that maximizes (13). As
in the presence of perfect capital markets, the institution decides to accept all applicants if
fv ≥ C(Qv), and shuts down otherwise.
Fees. The private institution decides the fee that maximizes (13) whenever fv ≥ C(Qv),




1+Qv + C (Qv) −
q
(Qv − C(Qv))
2 +( 1− C(Qv))(1 − Qv)
3
, (14)
whenever 0 ≤ Qv ≤ 1. Otherwise, the private university shuts down.
Quality. The university chooses Qv to maximize (13), where fv = fc






















The following proposition shows how private university’s optimal fee and quality are
aﬀected by the presence of borrowing constraints.
Proposition 4 In the presence of borrowing constraints, the private university chooses a
lower tuition fee and a lower level of educational quality than under perfect capital markets.
6The presence of borrowing constraints prevents some poor and talented individuals from
attending the private university since this institution uses fees as allocation device. Hence,
the demand of the university is lower than under perfect capital markets. The optimal
reaction of the private institution to the presence of borrowing constraints is to decrease
both its fee and quality to compensate for such decrease in student demand.
Summarizing, we have shown that universities’ diﬀerent objectives help explain why, in
the presence of borrowing constraints, public universities use exams as allocation device and
set a zero fee for its educational services, while private institutions prefer tuition fees. Inter-
estingly, the presence of borrowing constraints has a diﬀerent impact on public and private
institutions’ choices. Public quality and admission standards are not aﬀected, but both
quality and standards are lower in the private university due to the presence of borrowing
constraints.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have provided an explanation, based on universities’ objectives, for the
diﬀerent combinations of fees and exams observed across countries and higher education in-
stitutions. We have also analyzed the role of borrowing constraints in universities’ decisions.
In order to simplify the analysis, we have focused on two types of institutions; public and
surplus-maximizing, and private and proﬁt-maximizing universities. While our model is a
ﬁrst step to explain universities’ admission policies, some of the assumptions made deserve
some discussion.
Firstly, we have assumed that technology is the same across universities while there may
be diﬀerences between public and private institutions. The reason for such assumption is to
isolate the eﬀects that universities’ diﬀerent objectives may have on their choices of quality
and admission policies. Notice that even if private universities were more productive than
public, our qualitative results would not change. In particular, diﬀerences in the choice of
fees and exams, as well as in the reaction to the presence of borrowing constraints, would
persist across public and private universities. Secondly, the assumption that private univer-
sities are proﬁt maximizers may be questionable, provided that many private institutions are
non-proﬁt organizations. However, this does not mean that non-proﬁt organizations cannot
make proﬁts, but that proﬁts cannot be distributed to outsiders (see Winston (1999)). An al-
ternative objective function for private universities would be the maximization of educational
quality, as in Epple and Romano (2002).
The model presented here can be enriched with the inclusion of peer group eﬀects in the
human capital production function. The presence of peer eﬀects does undoubtedly aﬀect
the equilibrium allocation of students to schools. However, the fundamental diﬀerences
among public and private institutions are likely to persist. Our model also provides a useful
framework to study the interaction among public and private universities when they compete
for students (see Romero and Del Rey (2004)). The introduction of competition between
institutions in the model may also be important to explain universities’ choices and improve
the understanding of higher education markets.
7Appendix
A. Proofs of Proposition
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Under perfect capital markets, the public university decides
fb anticipating the optimal choice of exams in the next stage. We may distinguish two cases:















2Qb . Since utility is independent of
the fee, the university chooses any fee satisfying fb ≤ C (Qb).




Qb and fb >C(Qb). In this case,









Qb . The fee that
maximizes utility in this case satisﬁes fb = C (Qb), which contradicts the acceptance of all
applicants by the public university.
The optimal decision of the public university is to run an exam and set fb ≤ C (Qb).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . The ﬁrst result follows directly from the comparison of (8)
















Qp < 1 whenever 0 <Q p < 1.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . In the second stage, we have two cases:
CASE 1. The public university runs an exam, ac
b =
C(Qb)
Qb and fb ≤ C (Qb).









and the optimal fee, fc












Using the fact that C(Qb)=Qk




2Qb ≥ 0 if 0 ≤ Qb ≤ 1.
Notice that if Qb > 1, the public university sets fc
b =1and shuts down the school.
CASE 2. The public university accepts all applicants, ac
b =
fb
Qb and fb >C (Qb). The











(1 − fb) is fb ≤ C(Qb) if
Qb





Qb ≥ 0, and fb =1 , otherwise. Notice that fb ≤ C(Qb) contradicts
the fact that the public monopoly accepts all applicants.
Hence, the public university runs an exam and sets a zero fee in the presence of borrowing
constraints.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . The optimal private fee under borrowing constraints is given
by (14), and using C(Qv)=Qk
v, we see that Qv >f c
v >C (Qv) if 0 <Q v < 1 since in this
interval Qv >C (Qv).
From the comparison of fc
v, given by (14), with fp
v,g i v e nb y(10), we obtain that fc
v ≤ fp
v







≤ (Qv − C(Qv))
2 +( 1− C(Qv))(1 − Qv), (17)
which is satisﬁed if 0 ≤ Qv ≤ 1, and holds with strict inequality if 0 <Q v < 1.
Local quality maxima are the global maxima since private utility is equal to zero in the
extremes of the quality interval Qv = {0, 1}, and strictly positive if 0 <Q v < 1. Convexity
of costs in school quality implies that Qc
v <Q p




v, given by (15), with Qp
v, given by (11), we ﬁnd that Qc
v <Q p
v holds if and




























< 1 whenever Qv < 1. Therefore, both private educational quality and
tuition fees are lower in the presence of borrowing constraints.
B. Solution to the Universities’ Optimization Problem
Public University: Perfect Capital Markets
























= −Qb < 0. (19)








Qb − C(Qb)(1− ab) depends on whether fb ≤
C(Qb) or fb >C (Qb):
CASE 1. ab =
C(Qb)
Qb and fb ≤ C(Qb). Utility is independent of fees and any fee satisfying
fb ≤ C(Qb) is optimal.
CASE 2. ab =
fb
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b (Qb = Q
p








































b > 0. Hence, Q
p
b is the maximum of U
p
b.
Private University: Perfect Capital Markets
Exams. In the ﬁrst stage, the private monopoly decides to accept all applicants if fv ≥ C(Qv),
and shuts down otherwise.
Fees. The fee that maximizes Up





























2 is the maximum of Up
v whenever 0 ≤ Qv ≤ 1,w h i c hi sr e q u i r e df o r
fp
v ≥ C(Qv) to hold.
Quality. The level of quality that maximizes Up
v =( fp
v − C(Qv))(1 −b ap










































































































































































k . Therefore, Qp
v is the maximum of Up
v.
Public University: Borrowing Constraints
Exams. T h eo p t i m a lp u b l i ce x a mi st h es a m ea su n d e rp e r f e c tc a p i t a lm a r k e t s .
















Qb and fb ≤ C(Qb). The fee that maximizes Uc
b in this case is fc
b =0 ,
whenever 0 ≤ Qb ≤ 1, because public utility is strictly decreasing in fb. Otherwise, the




























































Qb ≥ 0, the interior maximum, 0 <f b < 1,s a t i s ﬁes
−fb + C(Qb) ≥ 0. Otherwise, it is optimal to set fb =1a n ds h u td o w nt h es c h o o l .N o t i c e
that −fb + C(Qb) ≥ 0 contradicts CASE 2.
Quality. The level of quality that maximizes Uc




b =0 , is the








¢k−1 < 1 since k>1.
Private University: Borrowing Constraints
Exams. The private university decides to accept all applicants if fv ≥ C(Qv), and shuts
down, otherwise.


























Solving (31) for fc






3 is the interior maximum whenever 0 <Q v < 1,
















3 is the minimum.
Non-interior maxima appear whenever Qv =0and then, fc
v =0 , and Qv =1 , in which case
fc
v =1 .




































11The existence of a global maximum is guaranteed provided that Uc
v is a continuous function
of Qv in the interval 0 ≤ Qv ≤ 1. The maximum cannot be attained in the extremes because
Uc
v (Qv =0 )=Uc
v (Qv =1 )=0 .S i n c e Uc
v is derivable and strictly positive in the interval
0 <Q v < 1, provided that Qv >f c
v >C (Qv) in this interval, the global maximum is attained
in a local maximum, 0 <Q c
v < 1, satisfying (33), which is strictly lower than the local (and
global) maximum under perfect capital markets, Qp
v, a ss h o w ni nP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
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